



Analyses of Topical Policy Issues

# Does international trade promote economic growth? Europe, 19th and 20th centuries

Oscar Bajo-Rubio <sup>a,\*</sup>, María del Carmen Ramos-Herrera <sup>b</sup><sup>a</sup> Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, Spain<sup>b</sup> Universidad de Alcalá, Spain

## ARTICLE INFO

## JEL classification:

F41  
F43  
N10  
O47

## Keywords:

International trade  
Economic growth  
Europe  
Granger-causality

## ABSTRACT

In this paper, we analyse the relationship between international trade and economic growth in an unbalanced panel of 20 European countries in a long-term perspective, since the mid-19th century to present days, differentiating between the periods before and after the start of the Second World War. To this end, we perform Granger-causality tests between exports and GDP, and between imports and GDP, following the novel methodology of Juodis et al. (2021) for panel data models with large cross-sectional and time series dimensions. Our results support the existence of a bi-directional relationship between both trade variables and GDP, for the whole period and across subperiods.

## 1. Introduction

The study of the relationship between external openness (or, more generally, increased economic integration) and economic growth, is a recurrent topic within the economic literature. Although this is not a new phenomenon, since it can be dated back at least to the last third of the 19th century (Baldwin and Martin, 1999), the process of increased integration of the international markets of goods, labour and capital has been termed in last years as “globalisation”.

According to the standard model of economic growth, a higher integration across countries, by removing the barriers to the mobility of goods and factors, would lead in the short run to an increased efficiency in the use of productive inputs. This in turn would translate into an increase in output from a given amount of inputs, i.e., the so-called static gains of integration. In the medium run, the increased level of production, by increasing savings and investment and then the capital stock, would lead to an additional increase in output. Finally, in the long run a permanent increase in the rate of growth might happen if the capital stock exhibits increasing returns to scale (directly in the production function, and by way of externalities); or, alternatively, if higher economic integration results in an increased rate of technological progress.

The above ideas, associated with the literature on endogenous growth, allow for a greater role of the countries' external openness in the process of generation and transmission of technology, as compared to the traditional, Solow-type, growth models. In principle, a process of economic integration would mean an increase in the size of the market, leading to greater research incentives, and hence to

The first author acknowledges financial support from the University of Castilla-La Mancha through the project 2022-GRIN-34,135, co-financed by the European Union via the European Regional Development Fund.

\* Corresponding author.

E-mail address: [oscar.bajo@uclm.es](mailto:oscar.bajo@uclm.es) (O. Bajo-Rubio).

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eap.2024.07.019>

Received 16 December 2023; Accepted 24 July 2024

Available online 30 July 2024

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higher growth (Romer, 1990). Also, integration would ease the diffusion of knowledge across countries, and avoid the duplication of the research activity. However, for a country with a comparative disadvantage in R&D-intensive activities, integration might result in a higher specialisation in sectors that are intensive in unskilled labour, which could eventually mean lower growth on deviating resources away from the R&D-intensive sectors (Grossman and Helpman, 1991). Further, a greater integration among relatively similar economies would lead to a higher rate of growth in the long run, on allowing to exploit at the world level the increasing returns to scale present in the R&D sector (Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991).

All this, in turn, would be related to another less formalized approach, originated in the field of economic history, i.e., the catch-up hypothesis. According to this theory, technological differences would be the main source of the differences in productivity across countries (Gerschenkron, 1962). Therefore, a relatively backward country could, in principle, “catch up” those more technologically advanced countries and increase its productivity levels, through the imitation and learning of those countries’ techniques. This process, though, would only occur if the backward country possesses the so-called “social capability”, i.e., the technical skills (assessed by the educational level of its population), as well as the political, commercial, industrial and financial institutions, which would allow it to realise its potential of technological catch-up as regards the most advanced countries (Abramovitz, 1986).

However, the unambiguously beneficial nature of free trade has been put into question in last years. According to Driskill (2012), the standard arguments in favour of free trade are “poor-quality”, since they are either incoherent or make implicit value judgements about which is good for the society as a whole. More specifically, external openness can result into sizeable and permanent redistributive effects, which get larger as trade barriers become smaller, at the same time that compensating the losers is problematic (for several reasons: it can be costly, the winners can be powerful enough to oppose redistributive measures, lack of incentives on the side of the government once liberalisation is underway...); and all this in turn lies behind the recent rise in populism (Rodrik, 2018). A review of the main issues related to trade and inequality can be found in Rodrik (2021); and for a discussion of the relationships between increased economic integration (i.e., globalisation) and populism, see Bajo-Rubio and Yan (2019).

Accordingly, since the relationship between external openness and economic growth seems to be far from unambiguous, we can conclude here with the influential paper of Rodríguez and Rodrik (2001), who state that such relationship would be rather contingent, on relying on a number of particular characteristics, both country-specific and external; see Rodríguez and Rodrik (2001) for details.

Turning to the empirical evidence, we can mention a number of papers that have used cointegration analysis and Granger-causality tests between exports and GDP growth for individual countries, obtaining mixed results; a non-exhaustive list would include Afxentiou and Serletis (1991), Kugler (1991), Marin (1992), Oxley (1993), Thornton (1996), Kónya (2006), Bajo-Rubio and Díaz-Roldán (2012) or Pistoresi and Rinaldi (2012), to name a few. Another stream of the literature, more directly related to endogenous growth theories, found, using econometric methods, that more open countries experienced faster growth; some contributions along these lines include, among many others, Dollar (1992), Ben-David (1993), Sachs and Warner (1995), Edwards (1998), Frankel and Romer (1999), Irwin and Tervio (2002), Noguer and Siscart (2005) or, more recently, Furceri et al. (2020). The latter results have been also discussed, or at least nuanced, though. For instance, Wacziarg and Welch (2008) stressed that the average effects mask the existence of large differences across countries regarding their response to trade liberalisation. Eriş and Ulaşan (2013) used Bayesian model averaging techniques to account for model uncertainty, and found no evidence that openness is directly and robustly correlated with economic growth. In turn, the results of Huchet-Bourdon et al. (2018) showed that the positive effect of exports on growth only appeared for those countries specialising in higher quality products. On the other hand, in a macroeconomic study for Spain over the period 1850–2000 Bajo-Rubio (2012) showed that the external deficit did not seem to have restrained the growth of the Spanish economy over the long run, unless some shorter and specific subperiods, such as 1940–1959 and 1959–1974. More recently, and also for the case of Spain for the period 1850–2020, Bajo-Rubio (2022) obtained that the favourable effect of exports on growth was much stronger in the final years of the 19th century, suggesting that the role of exports should be more important in the first stages of capitalist development, but not so much when the latter is underway.

On the other hand, a long-standing debate has developed within the field of economic history around the so-called “tariff-growth paradox”. In an influential study, Bairoch (1972) found a positive correlation between tariff protection and economic growth for several European countries over the period 1860–1913; these results were later confirmed in O’Rourke (2000) or Jacks (2006). However, although robust for the period before the First World War, the basic result does not seem to hold in more recent years, as shown by Vamvakidis (2002) or Clemens and Williamson (2004). In addition, such result has been qualified in some more recent contributions. So, Tena-Junguito (2010) found that protection was linked to higher growth in rich countries, but not in poor countries, which tend to protect more intensely low-skill-intensive sectors. In turn, Schularick and Solomou (2011) stressed the role of the “Long Depression” of the 1870s, which resulted in a rise in protectionism so that, when growth resumed in the 1890s, average tariff levels remained higher. Also, according to Lehmann and O’Rourke (2011), industrial tariffs, unlike agricultural tariffs, are those that would be positively correlated with growth. Lastly, in a recent paper, Potrafke et al. (2021) examined a particular case of study, namely, the election of a protectionist government in Sweden in 1887 and found no evidence that protectionist policies influenced economic growth.

We will also mention two other papers from the field of economic history, but not centred specifically on the “tariff-growth paradox”. Lampe and Sharp (2013) analysed the relationship between per capita income and protection, measured by the ratio of tariff revenue to imports, for 24 countries over the periods 1865–1913 and 1913–2000, using cointegrated VAR models. In the few cases where cointegration was found, the relationship between the two variables was mostly negative in both periods. However, in the second part of the sample, Granger-causality ran from income to tariffs, indicating that countries would have liberalised trade as they became richer. In turn, using the same methodology, Federico et al. (2017) estimated cointegration relationships between per capita GDP and openness, now measured by the ratio of exports to GDP, for 30 countries over the years 1830–2007. Again, cointegration was obtained just in about half of the cases, but now the relationship between the two variables was both positively and negatively signed.

From these results, the authors suggest that a positive relationship between openness and GDP seems more likely for poor countries.

The literature reviewed above, both from the economic growth tradition as well as from economic history, has been surveyed in Edwards (1992, 1993) and, more recently, in Andersen and Babula (2009) or Singh (2010); and, with a more long-term perspective, in Meissner (2014) or Lampe and Sharp (2019). However, as we have seen, neither from a theoretical standpoint nor according to the empirical evidence, the standard claim on lower barriers to international trade or a greater external openness, leading to faster economic growth, is unambiguously supported. Such an argument should be much nuanced, depending on the countries and the time period analysed. In this regard, a crucial factor when studying economic growth is the quality of the institutions prevailing in every country, for each historical episode (Crafts, 2004).

Our aim in this paper will be analysing the relationship between international trade and economic growth for the case of Europe in a long-term perspective, since the mid-19th century to present days, differentiating between the periods before and after the start of the Second World War. Notice that those countries which experienced a greater growth since the onset of industrialisation at the beginning of the 19th century were located in Europe, in particular in Western Europe. Specifically, we will apply Granger-causality tests to the world trade series from the Federico-Tena World Trade Historical Database (Federico and Tena-Junguito, 2019a), and the GDP series from the latest release available of the Maddison Project Database (Bolt and van Zanden, 2020), for an unbalanced panel of 20 European countries running from the mid-19th century to 1938; whereas for the period 1950–2022 we will make use, for the same countries, of the world trade and GDP series from the Penn World Table version 10.01 (Feenstra et al., 2015). It should be noticed that the available studies making use of Granger-causality tests quoted above apply them to data for individual countries, unlike this paper, where we perform a panel data analysis. The empirical application will make use of the novel methodology of Juodis et al. (2021) for panel data models with large cross-sectional and time series dimensions, whose main advantage is its superior size and power performance compared to previous approaches. In addition, we will also analyse the possible differentiated behaviour across subperiods, as well as performing the tests on a reduced sample made up of those countries for which data on the 19th century are available, i.e., 14 countries. The rest of the paper is organised as follows: a brief overview of the main trends of European trade is presented in Section 2; the econometric methodology is summarised in Section 3; the data and empirical results are discussed in Section 4; and the main conclusions are reported in Section 5.

## 2. The evolution of Europe's international trade

We present in Figs. 1 and 2, respectively, the evolution of exports and imports, and of GDP, of the five largest European economies, i.e., the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy and Spain, over the period 1850–1938. Also, Table 1 shows their cumulative growth





Fig. 1. Evolution of exports and imports: five largest European economies, 1850–1938 (thousands of millions US\$, 1913 prices). Source: Federico-Tena World Trade Historical Database (Federico and Tena-Junguito, 2019a).



**Fig. 2.** Evolution of GDP: five largest European economies, 1850–1938 (thousands of millions US\$, 2011 prices).

Source: Maddison Project Database, version 2020 (Bolt and van Zanden, 2020).

rates for the whole period and several subperiods, namely:

- 1850–1870, the time in which free trade prevailed;
- 1871–1913, where a move towards a greater protectionism took place;
- 1914–1929, the First World War and the subsequent recovery; and
- 1930–1938, the Great Depression.

On the whole, international trade witnessed a large expansion after the end of the Napoleonic Wars and until 1870, followed by a lower growth until 1913. After a recovery of the pre-war levels in the 1920s, international trade collapsed with the Great Depression. Only after the Second World War international trade resumed its growing trend. The rise in external openness along the 19th and 20th centuries concentrated in 1830–1870, and in 1972–2007 (Federico and Tena-Junguito, 2019b). In general terms, openness to international trade predominated over the period 1820–1870, whereas a rise in protectionism occurred between 1870 and 1913 (in particular since the 1880s), even though international trade still showed a substantial growth rate; the protectionist stance, however, reached a maximum in the interwar years (Zamagni, 2017).

As can be seen in Figs. 1 and 2 and in Table 1, external trade grew continuously until 1913, with growth rates always above those of GDP. Trade growth was higher before 1870, but kept an increasing trend afterwards, coupled with a growth of GDP higher than in the previous subperiod. International trade fell with the First World War, recovered afterwards, and collapsed with the Great Depression; at the same time that the growth of GDP remained positive despite the ups and downs associated with the war and the Great Depression.


The move towards free trade can be dated back to the 1840s, with crucial milestones such as the abolition of the Corn Laws in Britain in 1846, or the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty signed by Britain and France in 1860, followed by other tariff treaties across Europe and the extension of the most-favoured nation clause. On the other hand, an important factor behind the increase in international trade in the second half of the 19th century was the introduction of the steamship, which reduced enormously shipping costs and time in international maritime routes (Pascali, 2017).

In turn, the move towards protection after the 1870s, and especially the 1880s, can be related to the inflow of cheap grain from the United States and Russia, and the depression of 1873–1879, the longest and deepest experienced so far, which led to an increased demand for protection in the framework of an intensified nationalistic stance. Even though world trade did not suffer too much following this return to protection, some individual countries could be more particularly affected (Kenwood and Lougheed, 1999). Behind the fact that international trade kept its increasing trend before 1913 (although at a slower pace than in the previous subperiod) despite the rise in protectionism, the role of the decreasing trade costs has been emphasised elsewhere (Estevadeordal et al., 2003).

**Table 1**  
Cumulative growth rates of exports, imports, and GDP: five largest European economies, 1850–1938 (percentage points).

	Exports	Imports	GDP
1850–1870	5.01	4.70	1.64
1871–1913	3.06	3.25	1.99
1914–1929	1.41	2.90	1.64
1930–1938	−4.40	−1.09	1.77
1850–1938	2.17	2.81	1.66

Source: Own elaboration from [Federico and Tena-Junguito \(2019a\)](#) (columns 1 and 2), and [Bolt and van Zanden \(2020\)](#) (column 3).



**Fig. 3.** Evolution of exports and imports: five largest European economies, 1950–2022 (thousands of millions US\$, 2017 prices). Source: Penn World Table, version 10.01 ([Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer, 2015](#)).

Finally, despite the recovering of world trade after the First World War, its growth rates became negative after 1929, following the sequels of the Great Depression and coinciding with the exacerbation of protectionism, as exemplified by the Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act in the United States and the subsequent retaliation policies pursued in other countries. The collapse of international trade following the Great Depression was really impressive; in O'Rourke's words, "(T)he 1930s remain the canonical example of deglobalization" ([O'Rourke, 2019](#), p. 359).

On the other hand, Europe dominated world trade before 1913, a time in which trade consisted mostly of intra-European trade and trade of Europe with overseas areas, especially those colonised by Europeans; by 1913, Europe's trade accounted for 62 % of total world trade ([Kenwood and Lougheed, 1999](#)). On the whole, Europe exported manufactures (with a decreasing share over time of textiles, and an increasing share of metal products and other manufactures) and imported primary products (with a decreasing share over time of foodstuffs and agricultural raw materials, and an increasing share of non-agricultural raw materials). In turn, the share of Europe in world trade fell during the interwar years, at the expense of a higher share of North America and Asia, mostly Japan. The decreasing participation of textiles, and of foodstuffs and agricultural raw materials, continued during this period.

To sum up, even though international trade kept a steady rising trend during the 19th century and the first years of the 20th, at least until 1913, the greatest increase in trade and openness occurred in the period before 1870; or, in other terms, the first episode of globalisation culminated around 1870 ([Federico and Tena-Junguito, 2017](#)).

In a similar way, [Figs. 3 and 4](#) show, respectively, the evolution of exports and imports and GDP, for the same five largest European economies over the period 1950–2022. Their cumulative growth rates can be seen in [Table 2](#), for the whole period and the following




Fig. 4. Evolution of GDP: five largest European economies, 1950–2022 (thousands of millions US\$, 2017 prices). Source: Penn World Table, version 10.01 (Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer, 2015).

subperiods:

- 1950–1973, the so-called Golden Age of Capitalism<sup>1</sup>;
- 1974–1983, the two oil crises and their aftermath;
- 1984–2008, characterised by the reduction in the volatility of business cycle fluctuations, i.e., the so-called Great Moderation<sup>2</sup>; and
- 2009–2022, the global financial crisis and the Great Recession.

Both exports and imports have grown after 1950 at rates above world GDP, even though their growth has slowed down since the early 2000s, and in particular after 2008 with the start of the global financial crisis. In any case, the large expansion of international trade after the Second World War meant to a great extent the recovery of the pre-First World War levels; in fact the 1913 figures were only reached in the mid-1970s.

As in the second half of the 19th century, behind the rise in international trade there is a decline in international transportation costs, especially in air shipping, but also in ocean shipping (which still means the vast majority of world trade), which has become much faster, with larger and faster ships, together with a strong reduction in loading and unloading time thanks to containerization (Hummels, 2007). In addition, the institutional framework established after the Second World War favoured the liberalisation of international trade, starting with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) signed in 1947, which led to the formation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995.

Krugman (1995) identifies four aspects that characterise world trade after 1950, namely, “the rise of *intra-trade*, trade in similar goods between similar countries; the ability of producers to *slice up the value chain*, breaking a production process into many geographically separated steps; the resulting emergence of *supertraders*, countries with extremely high ratios of trade to GDP; and, the novelty that provokes the most anxiety, the emergence of large exports of manufactured goods from low-wage to high-wage nations” (Krugman, 1995, p. 332, italics in the original).

Furthermore, the lower growth of international trade in last years should be related to the lower levels of world GDP following the global financial crisis. Two additional reasons have been suggested to account for the slowdown in the growth of international trade (Hoekman, 2015). On the one hand, the process of incorporation of both the Central and Eastern European countries and China to the global economy is mostly completed in recent years. On the other hand, the expansion of the so-called global value chains (GVC) might also have come to a halt. In fact, the rise of GVCs (something already noted by Krugman in the above quotation), that is, when different

<sup>1</sup> The term “Golden Age” was popularised by Hobsbawm (1994).

<sup>2</sup> This empirical regularity has been established, among others, in McConnell and Pérez-Quirós (2000).

**Table 2**  
Cumulative growth rates of exports, imports, and GDP: five largest European economies, 1950–2022 (percentage points).

	Exports	Imports	GDP
1950–1973	7.84	8.44	5.14
1974–1983	3.93	2.76	2.04
1984–2008	5.30	5.70	2.26
2009–2022	3.47	3.42	1.34
1950–2022	5.42	5.49	2.88

Source: Own elaboration from Feenstra et al. (2015).

stages of the production process of a particular good or service are located across different countries, seems to be one of the most important features that shape the current developments in international trade.<sup>3</sup> In particular, unlike the traditional international trade that involves the participation of just two countries (i.e., exporter and importer), the GVCs entail production processes that often involve more than two countries (Antràs, 2020).

Finally, the relative importance of Europe in world trade continued to decrease along this period, accounting in last years for around 15 % of total. Even so, the European Union is one of the main actors in world trade, being the second largest exporter and importer of goods in the world, only after China for exports and after the United States for imports. While trade in services has increased greatly, trade in goods still represents around 70 % of the whole European trade in goods and services, mostly in machinery and transport equipment, chemicals and other manufacturing. Also, the European Union holds the first position at a world level in trade in services.

### 3. Econometric methodology

Granger-causality tests (Granger, 1969) are widely used in empirical analysis in economics. As regards their use with panel data, one of the first contributions is Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), who proposed a Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) testing framework for panels with a short time dimension and homogeneous coefficients. However, this GMM-based method proved to be highly inaccurate in panels with a large time dimension, so several procedures that could be applied in such cases have been developed; e.g., Arellano (2016) or Karavias and Tzavalis (2017), among others. Still, these alternative methods consider panels with homogeneous slopes, i.e., they assume the same slope for each individual (country), so that in cases in which the autoregressive parameters vary across individuals, inferences could not be valid even asymptotically. In particular, these procedures are subject to the so-called “Nickell bias” (Nickell, 1981), which appears in dynamic panel regressions with a very large individual dimension when the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term, leading to a substantial bias in the estimate of the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable.

In this paper, we apply the novel approach of Juodis et al. (2021) to testing for Granger-causality in panels with large individual and time dimensions, which accounts for the “Nickell bias” and is valid in models with homogeneous or heterogeneous coefficients. The novelty of this approach “comes from exploiting the fact that under the null hypothesis, while the individual effects and the autoregressive parameters may be heterogeneous across individuals, the Granger-causation parameters are all equal to zero and thus they are homogeneous” (Juodis et al., 2021, p. 94).

Specifically, in order to test for Granger-causality between the variables  $x$  and  $y$ , these authors consider the following dynamic panel data model:

$$y_{it} = \alpha_{0,i} + \sum_{p=1}^P \alpha_{p,i} y_{i,t-p} + \sum_{p=1}^P \beta_{p,i} x_{i,t-p} + \epsilon_{i,t} \quad i = 1, \dots, N; \quad t = 1, \dots, T \tag{1}$$

where  $\alpha_{0,i}$ ,  $\alpha_{p,i}$ , and  $\beta_{p,i}$  denote, respectively, the individual-specific effects, the heterogeneous autoregressive coefficients, and the Granger-causality parameters or the so-called heterogeneous feedback coefficients;  $\epsilon_{i,t}$  is the error term; and  $N$  and  $T$  represent the individual and time dimensions of the panel, respectively.

Under the null hypothesis, it is assumed that the Granger-causality parameters are zero, which implies that the feedback coefficients are homogeneous as follows:

$$H_0 : \beta_{p,i} = 0 \quad \text{for all } i \text{ and } p \tag{2}$$

and the alternative hypothesis is:

$$H_1 : \beta_{p,i} \neq 0 \quad \text{for some } i \text{ and } p \tag{3}$$

so that, when the null hypothesis is rejected,  $x_{i,t}$  would Granger-cause the dependent variable  $y_{it}$ .

Finally, Juodis et al. (2021) introduce the Half Panel Jackknife (HPJ) estimator of Dhaene and Jochmans (2015) in order to remove

<sup>3</sup> Amador and Cabral (2016) provide a review of the literature on GVCs.

the “Nickell bias”, and propose from there a Wald test, which is based on their bias-corrected estimator. As argued by the authors, the resulting approach performs well in a variety of settings and outperforms existing procedures.

#### 4. Data and empirical results

As mentioned before, for the first part of the sample we have made use of the exports and imports series from the Federico-Tena World Trade Historical Database (Federico and Tena-Junguito, 2019a), and the GDP series from the latest release available of the Maddison Project Database (Bolt and van Zanden, 2020). All series are valued in real terms (million 1913 US\$ for exports and imports, and million 2011 US\$ for GDP), and can be accessed at [https://www.uc3m.es/ss/Satellite/UC3MInstitucional/es/TextoMixta/1371246237481/Federico-Tena\\_World\\_Trade\\_Historical\\_Database](https://www.uc3m.es/ss/Satellite/UC3MInstitucional/es/TextoMixta/1371246237481/Federico-Tena_World_Trade_Historical_Database), and <https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/historicaldevelopment/maddison/releases/maddison-project-database-2020?lang=en>, respectively. In turn, for the second part of the sample we used the exports, imports, and GDP series from the Penn World Table version 10.01 (Feenstra et al., 2015). These series are also valued in real terms (million 2017 US\$), and are available for download at <https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt/?lang=en>. Our database is an unbalanced panel of 20 European countries, running from the mid-19th century to 1938, and from 1950 to 2022, which gives a total of 1508 and 1390 observations, respectively. The list of countries, and the years available for each of them, are shown in the Appendix.

In the rest of this section, we will present the results of performing Granger-causality tests, following the methodology of Juodis et al. (2021), between exports and GDP, and between imports and GDP, for our unbalanced panel of 20 European countries. We will examine first the results for the period mid-19th century to 1938, and then for the period 1950 to 2022.<sup>4</sup>

##### 4.1. Results for the period mid-19th century to 1938

As a first step of the analysis, we have performed some panel unit root tests in order to determine the order of integration of each variable. Since most of them require balanced datasets, in this paper we have implemented the test proposed by Im et al. (2003), which allows for unbalanced panel data, and relaxes the assumption of a common autoregressive parameter; as well as the Fisher-type test of Choi (2001). However, one of the main shortcomings of these first-generation panel unit root tests is that they tend to reject too often the null hypothesis of non-stationarity; see, e.g., Banerjee et al. (2004) or Lyhagen (2008). Accordingly, we have also performed a second-generation test, namely, the Cross-Sectionally Augmented Dickey-Fuller (CADF) test suggested by Pesaran (2007) to assess the robustness of the results. In particular, the CADF test allows to test for a unit root in the presence of cross-sectional dependence.

We present in Table 3 the results of these panel unit root tests, both first-generation, i.e., IPS (Im et al., 2003) and Fisher-type (Choi, 2001), and second-generation, i.e., CADF (Pesaran, 2007); for our three variables of interest, i.e., exports ( $X$ ), imports ( $M$ ) and GDP ( $Y$ ). According to the results of the tests, the three variables can be considered to be integrated of order 1, i.e.,  $I(1)$ .

Since all the variables were found to be  $I(1)$ , we proceed next to test for cointegration. Accordingly, we have performed several panel cointegration tests in order to determine whether a long-run relationship exists between  $X$  and  $Y$ , and between  $M$  and  $Y$ . In particular, we will present the results of the tests proposed by Pedroni (1999, 2004); as well as those of Westerlund (2005), which assume panel-specific cointegrating vectors where all panels have individual slope coefficients. The results of these tests, including in all cases a deterministic trend, are shown in Table 4 and allow us in general to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration, so that a long-run relationship would exist between both  $X$  and  $Y$ , and  $M$  and  $Y$ .<sup>5</sup>

Notice that, according to Granger (1988), if there is cointegration between a pair of variables, there must be causality between them in at least one direction. Table 5 presents the results of the Granger-causality tests, from either exports or imports to GDP in the first part of the table, and from GDP to either exports or imports, in the second part of the same table. In particular, we show the HPJ Wald tests of Juodis et al. (2021), together with the optimal lag of the variables, resulting from the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), for the whole period (where the starting year differs across countries: see Appendix), and for the four subperiods before 1870, 1871–1913, 1914–1929, and 1930–1938. For the whole period, the statistical evidence rejects the null hypothesis of non-causality between exports and GDP, and between imports and GDP, so there would be a bi-directional relationship between both trade variables and GDP. This outcome is robust when analysing the four subperiods, confirming the presence of two-way Granger-causality between exports and GDP, and between imports and GDP, also in each of the four subperiods.

Finally, in order to check the robustness of the previous results, we have performed the Granger-causality tests on a reduced sample made up of those countries for which data on the 19th century are available. This implies dropping the 6 countries for which only data for the 20th century, in most cases just after 1920, exist, which might distort the results from the whole sample. The results for this reduced

<sup>4</sup> Notice that, in addition to the levels of exports and imports, we also intended to use the level of external openness (i.e., the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP) when investigating the relationship of international trade and GDP. However, since in our data sources for the first part of the sample exports and imports, on the one hand, and GDP, on the other hand, were measured in real terms but with a different year of reference (i.e., 1913 for exports and imports and 2011 for GDP) and we had no way to connect them, we decided not to use this usual measure of external openness. In any case, note that Federico and Tena-Junguito (2017) advised against its use, on the grounds that international trade statistics include transportation and other related costs in the value of imports, so the usual measure of openness would become meaningless in the presence of large changes in these costs without any change in import flows.

<sup>5</sup> Notice that, in order to check the robustness of these results, some other panel cointegration tests have been also performed, namely, the Kao (1999) tests, and the Fisher/Johansen tests of Maddala and Wu (1999). The results, available from the authors upon request, allow us to confirm the basic results in Table 4.

**Table 3**

Panel unit root tests: period mid-19th century to 1938.

First-generation panel unit root tests						
	Y	X	M	$\Delta Y$	$\Delta X$	$\Delta M$
<b>IPS</b>						
Level	3.950 (0.9999)	-0.5881 (0.2782)	1.2734 (0.8986)	-21.8476 (0.0000)	-26.1755 (0.0000)	-26.5084 (0.0000)
Trend	-5.1247 (0.0000)	-3.3458 (0.0004)	-3.7214 (0.0001)	-22.4122 (0.0000)	-26.3657 (0.0000)	-26.6479 (0.0000)
<b>Fisher</b>						
Level	-3.3836 (0.9996)	-0.5491 (0.7085)	-0.5579 (0.6983)	40.6155 (0.0000)	52.3473 (0.0000)	46.8414 (0.0000)
Trend	-1.0736 (0.8585)	-0.8689 (0.1935)	-0.8471 (0.5696)	34.3227 (0.0000)	43.5254 (0.0000)	37.9771 (0.0000)
Second-generation panel unit root tests						
	Y	X	M	$\Delta Y$	$\Delta X$	$\Delta M$
<b>CADF</b>						
Level	5.591 (1.000)	-0.330 (0.371)	-1.839 (0.033)	-15.965 (0.000)	-19.752 (0.000)	-18.380 (0.000)
Trend	4.762 (1.000)	-1.635 (0.051)	-1.407 (0.080)	-14.604 (0.000)	-19.356 (0.000)	-17.426 (0.000)

Note: *p*-values in parentheses.**Table 4**

Panel cointegration tests: period mid-19th century to 1938.

A) Between X and Y				
<i>Pedroni residual panel cointegration test</i>				
<i>Within-Dimension Panel Cointegration tests</i>	Statistic	Prob	Weighted statistic	Prob
Panel v-statistic	7.7556	0.0000	-0.9544	0.8301
Panel rho-statistic	-4.0321	0.0000	-9.4429	0.0000
Panel PP-statistic	-1.0075	0.1568	-4.5929	0.0000
Panel ADF-statistic	-0.3485	0.3637	-4.4947	0.0000
<i>Between-Dimension Panel Cointegration tests</i>	Statistic	Prob		
Group rho-statistic	-6.0235	0.0000		
Group PP-statistic	-6.1108	0.0000		
Group ADF-statistic	-6.2875	0.0000		
<i>Westerlund panel cointegration test</i>				
	Statistic	Prob	-	-
Variance ratio ( $H_0$ : Some panels are cointegrated)	-1.5528	0.0602		
Variance ratio ( $H_0$ : All panels are cointegrated)	-0.3024	0.3812		
B) Between M and Y				
<i>Pedroni residual panel cointegration test</i>				
<i>Within-Dimension Panel Cointegration tests</i>	Statistic	Prob	Weighted statistic	Prob
Panel v-statistic	7.6540	0.0000	4.5773	0.0000
Panel rho-statistic	-0.2234	0.4116	-2.0292	0.0212
Panel PP-statistic	3.6216	0.9999	-0.4228	0.3362
Panel ADF-statistic	2.7662	0.9972	-0.7602	0.2236
<i>Between-Dimension Panel Cointegration tests</i>	Statistic	Prob		
Group rho-statistic	-1.6976	0.0448		
Group PP-statistic	-3.0702	0.0011		
Group ADF-statistic	-3.7458	0.0001		
<i>Westerlund panel cointegration test</i>				
	Statistic	Prob	-	-
Variance ratio ( $H_0$ : Some panels are cointegrated)	-3.5513	0.0002		
Variance ratio ( $H_0$ : All panels are cointegrated)	-3.3052	0.0005		

**Table 5**

Pairwise Granger-causality tests between exports, imports, and GDP: period mid-19th century to 1938.

	$X \rightarrow Y$			$M \rightarrow Y$		
	HPJ Wald test	BIC	Optimal lag	HPJ Wald test	BIC	Optimal lag
whole period	36.18 [0.0000]	28097.45	4	61.14 [0.0000]	27139.45	4
before 1870	285.13 [0.0000]	7332.59	4	633.53 [0.0000]	6629.78	4
1871–1913	114.62 [0.0000]	8528.68	4	552.73 [0.0000]	8425.77	4
1914–1929	129.80 [0.0000]	2453.12	4	158.29 [0.0000]	2436.20	4
1930–1938	27.73 [0.0000]	2035.13	2	48.01 [0.0000]	2113.23	2
	$Y \rightarrow X$			$Y \rightarrow M$		
	HPJ Wald test	BIC	Optimal lag	HPJ Wald test	BIC	Optimal lag
whole period	235.12 [0.0000]	12795.19	4	94.10 [0.0000]	13011.29	4
before 1870	1783.40 [0.0000]	2777.99	4	1090.16 [0.0000]	2496.74	4
1871–1913	47.58 [0.0000]	3616.85	4	272.40 [0.0000]	3658.56	4
1914–1929	21.59 [0.0002]	1284.91	4	545.48 [0.0000]	1318.10	4
1930–1938	48.36 [0.0000]	965.96	2	72.41 [0.0000]	1082.52	2

Note: *p*-values in square brackets.**Table 6**

Pairwise Granger-causality tests between exports, imports, and GDP: 19th century sample.

	$X \rightarrow Y$			$M \rightarrow Y$		
	HPJ Wald test	BIC	Optimal lag	HPJ Wald test	BIC	Optimal lag
whole period	444.81 [0.0000]	26226.10	4	231.81 [0.0000]	25377.55	4
before 1870	278.59 [0.0000]	7539.75	4	2333.78 [0.0000]	6853.34	4
1871–1913	1408.52 [0.0000]	7488.20	4	148.11 [0.0000]	7449.47	4
1914–1929	383.72 [0.0000]	2031.15	4	29.72 [0.0000]	2031.63	4
1930–1938	59.34 [0.0000]	934.51	2	19.57 [0.0001]	941.84	2
	$Y \rightarrow X$			$Y \rightarrow M$		
	HPJ Wald test	BIC	Optimal lag	HPJ Wald test	BIC	Optimal lag
whole period	1470.81 [0.0000]	11823.23	4	37.45 [0.0000]	12249.10	4
before 1870	2942.97 [0.0000]	2844.17	4	1688.94 [0.0000]	2560.98	4
1871–1913	1081.02 [0.0000]	3216.10	4	3418.41 [0.0000]	3323.92	4
1914–1929	172.26 [0.0002]	1048.67	4	30.95 [0.0000]	1101.27	4
1930–1938	424.69 [0.0208]	424.69	2	5.58 [0.0612]	455.47	2

Note: *p*-values in square brackets.

sample, termed “19th century sample” and consisting of 1405 observations, appear in Table 6. Again, the statistical results support the existence of two-way Granger-causality between exports and GDP, and between imports and GDP, both for the whole period and in the four subperiods.

#### 4.2. Results for the period 1950 to 2022

As we did for the first part of the sample, we first performed several panel unit root tests in order to determine the order of integration of each variable. The results, shown in Table 7, allow us to not reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for our three

**Table 7**

Panel unit root tests: period 1950 to 2022.

First-generation panel unit root tests						
	Y	X	M	$\Delta Y$	$\Delta X$	$\Delta M$
<b>IPS</b>						
Level	12.9458 (1.0000)	32.8155 (1.0000)	33.2790 (1.0000)	-13.9733 (0.0000)	-15.7707 (0.0000)	-15.6848 (0.0000)
Trend	4.3575 (1.0000)	13.0281 (1.0000)	15.0986 (1.0000)	-15.9062 (0.0000)	-21.2282 (0.0000)	-21.0010 (0.0000)
<b>Fisher</b>						
Level	-4.0445 (1.0000)	-4.4715 (1.0000)	-4.4719 (1.0000)	12.9483 (0.0000)	17.1241 (0.0000)	13.8075 (0.0000)
Trend	-3.7336 (0.9999)	-4.4525 (1.0000)	-4.4688 (1.0000)	11.8199 (0.0000)	46.9902 (0.0000)	37.4395 (0.0000)
Second-generation panel unit root tests						
	Y	X	M	$\Delta Y$	$\Delta X$	$\Delta M$
<b>CADF</b>						
Level	6.1960 (1.0000)	9.5510 (1.0000)	8.9230 (1.0000)	-13.8100 (0.0000)	-12.2690 (0.0000)	-14.8040 (0.0000)
Trend	2.6150 (0.9960)	2.3140 (0.9900)	2.0830 (0.9810)	-13.3030 (0.0000)	-11.2210 (0.0000)	-13.7400 (0.0000)

Note: *p*-values in parentheses.

**Table 8**

Panel cointegration tests: period 1950 to 2022.

A) Between X and Y				
<i>Pedroni residual panel cointegration test</i>				
<i>Within-Dimension Panel Cointegration tests</i>	Statistic	Prob	Weighted statistic	Prob
Panel v-statistic	3.5244	0.0002	4.2895	0.0000
Panel rho-statistic	-2.0988	0.0179	-2.4343	0.0075
Panel PP-statistic	-2.8267	0.0024	-3.0310	0.0012
Panel ADF-statistic	-3.1137	0.0009	-3.3664	0.0004
<i>Between-Dimension Panel Cointegration tests</i>	Statistic	Prob		
Group rho-statistic	-0.5910	0.2773		
Group PP-statistic	-1.8923	0.0292		
Group ADF-statistic	-3.4621	0.0003		
<i>Westerlund panel cointegration test</i>				
	Statistic	Prob		
Variance ratio ( $H_0$ : Some panels are cointegrated)	-2.2950	0.0109		
Variance ratio ( $H_0$ : All panels are cointegrated)	-1.3454	0.0892		
B) Between M and Y				
<i>Pedroni residual panel cointegration test</i>				
<i>Within-Dimension Panel Cointegration tests</i>	Statistic	Prob	Weighted statistic	Prob
Panel v-statistic	0.8717	0.1917	1.6798	0.0465
Panel rho-statistic	-0.8005	0.2117	-2.7514	0.0030
Panel PP-statistic	-1.6880	0.0457	-3.2913	0.0005
Panel ADF-statistic	-0.7018	0.2414	-2.1618	0.0153
<i>Between-Dimension Panel Cointegration tests</i>	Statistic	Prob		
Group rho-statistic	-1.0647	0.0143		
Group PP-statistic	-2.1718	0.0149		
Group ADF-statistic	-1.6588	0.0486		
<i>Westerlund panel cointegration test</i>				
	Statistic	Prob		
Variance ratio ( $H_0$ : Some panels are cointegrated)	-0.7456	0.2280		
Variance ratio ( $H_0$ : All panels are cointegrated)	-3.3358	0.0091		

**Table 9**

Pairwise Granger-causality tests between exports, imports, and GDP: period 1950 to 2022.

	$X \rightarrow Y$			$M \rightarrow Y$		
	HPJ Wald test	BIC	Optimal lag	HPJ Wald test	BIC	Optimal lag
whole period	172.70 [0.0000]	20982.14	4	94.75 [0.0000]	20975.73	4
1950–1973	213.80 [0.0000]	3368.84	4	160.96 [0.0000]	3387.60	4
1974–1983	35.30 [0.0000]	1683.27	1	3.15 [0.0759]	1696.82	1
1984–2008	482.43 [0.0000]	3964.84	4	2.6e+03 [0.0000]	3969.52	4
2009–2022	47.30 [0.0000]	3179.64	2	4.38 [0.1118]	3169.99	2
	$Y \rightarrow X$			$Y \rightarrow M$		
	HPJ Wald test	BIC	Optimal lag	HPJ Wald test	BIC	Optimal lag
whole period	1.8e+04 [0.0000]	20026.05	4	8.4e+04 [0.0000]	20054.25	4
1950–1973	419.93 [0.0000]	3643.72	4	2.2e+03 [0.0000]	3857.77	4
1974–1983	14.04 [0.0002]	1979.04	1	15.47 [0.0001]	1992.63	1
1984–2008	4.5e+03 [0.0000]	4924.04	4	8.2e+03 [0.0000]	4969.45	4
2009–2022	2.0e+08 [0.0000]	2745.87	2	6.4e+06 [0.0000]	825.21	2

Note: *p*-values in square brackets.

variables, so they would be integrated of order 1, i.e.,  $I(1)$ . Also, the results of the panel cointegration tests in Table 8 lead us to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration, so that a long-run relationship would exist between both  $X$  and  $Y$ , and  $M$  and  $Y$ .<sup>6</sup>

Next, we present in Table 9 the results of the Granger-causality tests for this second part of the sample, for the whole period and for the four subperiods 1950–1973, 1974–1983, 1984–2008, and 2009–2022. Again, both for the whole period and the four subperiods the statistical evidence rejects the null hypothesis of non-causality between exports and GDP, and between imports and GDP, so there would be a bi-directional relationship between the two trade variables and GDP. Only in the last subperiod (i.e., 2009–2022) the HPJ Wald test statistic do not allow to reject the null hypothesis from imports to GDP, even though with a probability level of just 11 %, meaning that in this subperiod GDP would Granger-cause imports but not the other way round.<sup>7</sup>

Therefore, even though a rise in international trade may have promoted economic growth in Europe both between the mid-19th century and the start of the Second World War, and from the post-war years to present days (see the arguments in the literature quoted in the introduction), the relationship may have also worked in the opposite direction. In particular, higher growth may have enhanced higher exports by boosting skills and technology that improved the efficiency of the exporting sector, or by allowing the exploitation of scale economies in the exporting sector (see, e.g., Helpman and Krugman, 1985); whereas higher growth should have led to a higher demand for imports, as assumed in the standard macroeconomic model.

## 5. Conclusions

We have analysed in this paper the relationship between international trade and economic growth in a long-term perspective, in an unbalanced panel of 20 European countries, over the period elapsing from the mid-19th century to present days, and differentiating between the periods before and after the start of the Second World War. Our data sources were the exports and imports from the Federico-Tena World Trade Historical Database, and the GDP from the latest release available of the Maddison Project Database, for the period mid-19th century–1938; and the world trade and GDP series from the Penn World Table version 10.01 for the period 1950–2022. In the empirical application, we made use of Granger-causality tests between exports and GDP, and between imports and GDP, following the novel methodology of Juodis et al. (2021) for panel data models with large cross-sectional and time series dimensions. In addition to the whole period, we also analysed the possible differentiated behaviour across different subperiods, namely, before 1870, 1871–1913, 1914–1929 and 1930–1938 for the first part of the sample; and 1950–1973, 1974–1983, 1984–2008 and 2009–2022 for the second part of the sample.

The statistical evidence rejected the null hypothesis of non-causality between the trade variables and GDP, supporting the existence

<sup>6</sup> As before, both the Kao and Fisher/Johansen tests allow us to confirm the conclusions of Table 8 (results available from the authors upon request).

<sup>7</sup> Notice that the last years of the sample might be affected by the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, when performing the tests for the period ending at 2019, instead of 2022, the results are basically unchanged (results available from the authors upon request).

of a bi-directional relationship between both trade variables and GDP. This outcome was robust across subperiods (with the only exception of the non-causality from imports to GDP found between 2009 and 2022), and also when the Granger-causality tests were performed on a reduced sample made up of the 14 countries for which data on the 19th century were available. Summing up, despite the different nature of international trade in the 19th and in the 20th century, and before and after the Second World War, our basic result of a bi-directional relationship between international trade and GDP still holds.

Therefore, according to the results of this paper, even if we found a positive influence of international trade on economic growth for the case of Europe between the mid-19th century to present days, such a relationship would be more complex than that since it also worked the other way round. This leads to qualify the role of international trade, and in general of external openness, as a driver of economic growth. While more international trade would lead to higher growth, higher growth would also lead to more international trade, in a mutual interrelationship.

Finally, if we extrapolate these results to the current events, since the redistributive effects of trade liberalisation get larger, tending to offset their benefits, as trade barriers become smaller (Rodrik, 2018), and given the unclear role of international trade as a growth driver, some reactions to an “excess” of globalisation may be expected. Accordingly, rather than proceeding further with globalisation, protecting people and regions from the risks associated with this “excessive” globalisation should be a priority for governments (O’Rourke, 2019).

## Appendix

The countries used in the estimations, and the years available for each of them, are as follows:

Countries	Years
Austria	1920–1937; 1950–2022
Belgium	1846–1913; 1919–1938; 1950–2022
Bulgaria	1910; 1920–1921; 1924–1938; 1970–2022
Denmark	1841–1938; 1950–2022
Finland	1850; 1860–1938; 1950–2022
France	1820–1938; 1950–2022
Germany	1850–1938; 1950–2022
Greece	1850–1938; 1950–2022
Hungary	1920; 1924–1938; 1970–2022
Ireland	1922–1938; 1950–2022
Italy	1850–1938; 1950–2022
Netherlands	1820–1938; 1950–2022
Poland	1929–1938; 1970–2022
Portugal	1820–1850; 1855; 1861; 1865–1938; 1950–2022
Romania	1870; 1890; 1900; 1910; 1913; 1920–1938; 1960–2022
Spain	1825; 1835; 1845; 1850–1938; 1950–2022
Sweden	1820–1938; 1950–2022
Switzerland	1851–1938; 1950–2022
Norway	1830–1938; 1950–2022
United Kingdom	1820–1938; 1950–2022

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